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Abstract 
 
Much of the literature examining the effects of oil shocks asks the question ―What is an 
oil shock?‖ and has concluded that oil-price increases are asymmetric in their effects on 
the US economy.  That is, sharp increases in oil prices affect economic activity adversely, 
but sharp decreases in oil prices have no effect.  We reconsider the directional symmetry 
of oil-price shocks by addressing the question ―Where is an oil shock?‖, the answer to 
which reveals a great deal of spatial/directional asymmetry across states.  Although most 
states have typical responses to oil-price shocks—they are affected by positive shocks 
only—the rest experience either negative shocks only (5 states), both positive and 
negative shocks (5 states), or neither shock (5 states). 
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1. Introduction 
 Oil-price shocks are often viewed as one of the primary exogenous causes of 
national macroeconomic fluctuations.  Hamilton (2005), for example, suggests that nine 
of the ten recessions in the United States between 1945 to 2005 were preceded by large 
positive increases in oil prices.
1
  Despite the preeminence of sharply increasing oil prices 
in advance of recessions, however, large decreases in oil prices have not tended to be 
followed by abnormally high national growth.  This fact has led to a general acceptance 
that oil-price shocks are directionally asymmetric: Large positive oil-price shocks matter, 
but negative ones do not.  Given the consensus view, studies have, for the most part, 
simply imposed directional asymmetry while focusing on the best ways to implement oil-
price shocks into empirical models.
2
  Hamilton (2003), titled ―What is an Oil Shock?‖, is 
a prominent representative of these efforts.   
 Figure 1 illustrates the consensus described above and uses a Hamilton-type oil-
price variable for which shocks occur only when the change in oil prices is larger than 
what had been experience in the recent past.
3
  All six official U.S. recessions since 1971 
were preceded by upward spikes in oil prices, whereas real GDP growth was seemingly 
unaffected by the downward spikes of 1984-85, 1986, 1993, and 1998.   
                                                 
1
 More recently, Engemann, Kliesen, and Owyang (forthcoming) confirms this tendency for the United 
States and finds it across six additional OECD countries. 
2
 A notable exception is Kilian and Vigfusson (2010), who argue that censoring the oil price series in a 
VAR environment can produce biased impulse responses to oil shocks if the true data generating process 
for the shocks is not asymmetric.  Also, Elder and Serletis (2010) find that these results can be influenced 
by oil-price volatility. 
3
 This variable is described in more detail in section 2. 
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 As our title suggests, our interest is in the locations of the effects of oil-price 
shocks.  Specifically, we reexamine the consensus on oil-price shocks in the context of 
state-level business cycles.  Our focus on the ―where‖ of oil-price shocks is motivated by 
recent studies finding that state-level business cycles can differ a great deal from each 
other and from that of the country as a whole.  In particular, energy-producing states and 
their neighbors have tended to experience idiosyncratic recessions following negative oil-
price shocks, while often not experiencing the recessions seen at the national level 
(Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2005; Crone, 2005; and Hamilton and Owyang, forthcoming).    
 Figure 2, which compares oil-price shocks to the state recessions determined by 
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) for 1979-2002, illustrates the potential variety across 
states in the relationship between oil prices and the business cycle.  The top panel shows  
  
Figure 1. National Recessions and Oil-Price Shocks 
 
NBER recessions are shaded gray; Dark gray columns are real GDP 
growth; Black line is a Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable. 
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  Figure 2. State Recessions and Oil-Price Shocks 
 
OPW (2005) state-level recessions are shaded gray. Black 
line is a Hamilton-type oil-price shock variable. 
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that North Carolina‘s experience was largely in line with that of the U.S., although North 
Carolina‘s 1990-92 recession began just prior to the sharp rise in oil prices that preceded 
the national recession.  The middle panel of Figure 2 shows that Texas, a prominent 
energy-producing state, had a distinctly idiosyncratic business cycle, especially with 
regard to the role of oil prices.  Specifically, Texas was in recession in 1979, but did not 
go into recession in 1980 or the early 1990s.  It did, however, go into recession following 
the negative price shock of 1986.  Finally, although Texas did experience a recession 
following the positive price shocks of 1980-81, it did not do so until nearly a full year 
after the start of the national recession.  Of the three states illustrated in Figure 2, New 
Mexico was the most unfortunate in that it tended to experience recessions following 
both positive and negative oil-price shocks.  Further, its recovery from recession in 1996 
coincided with a sharp increase in oil prices.  As with Texas, the role of oil in New 
Mexico‘s business cycle does not fit very well with the consensus view. 
 Our statistical approach follows Hamilton (2003), although we allow for positive 
and negative oil-price shocks.  After applying the model to each state individually, we 
consider several variations on the notion of directional symmetry, all of which indicate 
that the usual result is far from the rule across states.  For example, only 21 states pass a 
standard test for directional asymmetry, which is that the sums of the coefficients on 
positive and negative shocks are not statistically the same.  After these test for the 
existence of positive and negative shocks, we look at the relative magnitudes of their 
effects across states and find similarly diverse results.  For example, when we look at 
5 
 
whether or not there is any significant response for at least one quarter following a shock, 
the states fall into four categories: Although 35 states experience only positive shocks, 
five see only negative shocks, another five see both positive and negative shocks, and the 
remaining five see neither shock.    
 In addition to estimating the state-by-state effects of oil-price shocks, our analysis 
provides general insights into the effects of oil prices by considering 51 macroeconomic 
responses rather than one.  Further, our use of state-level data has at least one technical 
advantage over the use of national-level data alone.  Specifically, with national data there 
is a potentially serious endogeneity problem because the typical assumption is that oil-
price shocks are exogenous and caused by events external to the U.S. economy (Barsky 
and Kilian, 2004; Killian 2008a, 2008b, and 2009).  Given the size and importance of the 
U.S. economy, this assumption is obviously problematic.  In contrast, our assumption that 
the world oil price is exogenous at the state level requires significantly less credulity.   
 We should note several papers that have investigated state or regional 
heterogeneity in the responses to oil-price shocks, although none is adequate for 
addressing the questions we address.  Three have applied VARs to a handful of states and 
allowed for positive oil-price shocks only (Penn, 2006; Iledare and Olatubi, 2004; and 
Bhattacharya, 2003).  Others merely imputed state effects from industry-level results 
rather than looking at actual states (Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara, 1997; Brown and 
Yücel, 1995), while still others have derived regional effects from measures of resource 
dependence (Brown and Hill, 1988).   
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 The balance of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model 
and presents national-level empirical results that serve as a benchmark.  Section 3 uses 
state-level data and considers spatial asymmetries in the responses to oil.  Section 4 
summarizes and concludes. 
2. Empirical Implementation 
 A common approach to modeling the effect of oil-price shocks is to use a 
bivariate, single-equation model of GDP, where GDP growth is determined by lags of 
itself and past innovations to oil prices.  Because output data are not available at a 
suitable frequency for states, we use payroll employment.  Specifically, we model the 
growth rate in state i’s employment, Δyit, as an AR(4): 
  
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iN  , and 

 jtx  and 

 jtx  are oil-price shocks whose directions are 
denoted by their superscripts.  The preceding formulation allows us to measure potential 
asymmetric responses of state-level economic variables to oil shocks through the 
coefficients γij and κij.  In (1), jtiY  , is the weighted growth rate of employment for all 
states excluding state i, and Dt-j is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 for the 
post-Hurricane-Katrina period.  Obviously, (1) represents some restrictions on the cross-
state relationships.  Specifically, as in Carlino and DeFina (1998 and 1999), the model 
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does not allow a complete set of cross-state correlations, except through the jtiY  , , so 
we estimate a separate specification for each state. 
 In Hamilton's (1983) original paper, oil shocks are defined as the log change in oil 
prices under the implicit assumption that the effect of oil shocks on economic activity 
was symmetric—i.e.,  jj .  This condition was relaxed in Mork (1989), who 
modeled potential asymmetries but utilized the same log change in oil prices as the 
baseline shock.  These approaches assume that small innovations in oil prices affect 
economic activity proportionately to large changes.  On the other hand, one might believe 
that economic agents do no change their behavior in the presence of small fluctuations in 
oil prices, so Hamilton (1996; 2003) and others assume that the effects of oil price shocks 
are not only asymmetric but nonlinear.  Hamilton (2003) shows that the best-fit model is 
one in which oil price shocks only have effects if the rise in prices is substantial—i.e., if 
the current (quarterly) price of oil rises above the maximum over the last year.
4
  Thus, we 
define an oil-price shock as 
)2(,
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which assumes that only increases in oil prices affect economic activity.  Similarly, a 
negative oil-price shock is defined as 
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4
 Hamilton uses the last month of the quarter as the quarterly oil price and Hamilton (2008) uses a three-
year window and argues that the fit is better. 
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 We estimate equation (1) first for the United States and then for each of the 50 
states plus the District of Columbia.  Our measure of oil prices is the producer's price 
index for oil, although WTI yields similar results.  Our benchmark estimate of (1) uses 
the log change of seasonally-adjusted quarterly non-farm payroll employment for the 
United States for 1961.1 to 2008:4.  Note that several studies have documented a change 
over time in the relationship between oil and the macroeconomy (Blanchard and Galí, 
2010; Blanchard and Riggi, 2009).  To allow for this, we estimate a one-time structural 
break in the relationship between oil and national employment growth using a relatively 
standard sup-Wald test (Andrews 1993) and find a structural break at 1973:4.  This break 
coincides with the Arab oil embargo and the emergence of a OPEC as an active cartel. 
 Our regression results are provided in Table 1.  Note that because there were no 
negative price shocks during the pre-break period it is not possible to estimate their effect 
for that sub-sample.  For the full sample and the post-break sample, it is clear that the 
relationship between employment growth and oil prices is distinctly different depending 
on the direction of the oil-price shock.  For both samples, employment growth has a 
statistically significant negative response two, three, and four quarters after a positive oil-
price shock, but no such response occurs following negative oil-price shocks.  More 
formally, the usual directional asymmetry, whereby only positive price shocks matter, is 
indicated for a state if   0j   but   0j .  A higher statistical hurdle for 
asymmetry is a failure to reject that   jj .  As Table 2 shows, directional 
symmetry is rejected by both criteria for the full sample and the post-break sample.  
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Table 1. Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly U.S. Employment Growth 
Variable jty   

 jtx  

 jtx      
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
Coefficient β1 
 
β2 
 
β3 
 
β4 
 
γ1  
γ2  
γ3  
γ4  
κ1  
κ2  
κ3  
κ4  
 α 
 
              
Full Sample, 
1961:2-2008:4 
0.879 * -0.189 † 0.089  -0.092  0.001  -0.008 * -0.010 * -0.010 * 0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.210 * 
(0.076) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.038) 
 
                           
Pre-Break, 
1961:2-1973:3 
0.856 * -0.170  -0.001  -0.116  0.017  -0.061  -0.044  -0.009  
    
0.337 * 
(0.165) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
     
(0.092) 
 
                           
Post-Break, 
1973:4-2008:4 
0.892 * -0.206 † 0.112  -0.094  0.001  -0.007 † -0.009 * -0.009 * 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.180 * 
(0.090) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.044) 
 
              
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and ‗†‘. 
 
 
Table 2. Tests of Aggregate Directional Symmetry 
H0: 
     
0 i  
 
    
0 i   ii  
 
 i   
     F(.)   i  
    F(.) 
 
    F(.) 
 
Full Sample -0.028 20.05 * 0.000 0.00 
 
7.61 * 
Pre-Break -0.097 1.83 
 
 
   
Post-Break -0.025 13.77 * -0.002 0.09 
 
4.41 * 
Statistical significance at the 5 percent level is indicated by ‗*‘. 
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 Using the estimated coefficients reported in Table 1, we generate impulse 
responses and evaluate positive and negative price shocks in terms of the depth and 
frequency of their effects.  Figure 3 displays the impulse responses for the post-break 
period and yield the typical results:  Employment growth is reduced by a positive oil-
price shock for several quarters before returning to normal, but a negative shock has no 
statistically significant effect on employment growth.  Although we used U.S. 
employment rather than GDP as our measure of economic activity, our results are 
generally consistent with the existing literature on the effects of oil-price shocks. 
Figure 3. U.S. Employment Growth Response to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break 
 
 
3. The Spatial/Directional Asymmetry of Oil-Price Shocks 
 In this section, we demonstrate that the state-level analogue of the analysis 
performed above yields a great deal of heterogeneity in the effects of oil-price shocks.  
We explore this spatial/directional asymmetry from two complementary perspectives: the 
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estimated coefficients on the oil-price shock variables and the impulse responses to oil-
price shocks.   
3.1. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry I: Oil-Price Shock Coefficients 
 We performed 51 independent estimations of equation (1) for the post-break 
period, the results of which are are analogous to those in Table 1 for the U.S. and are 
provided in an appendix.  As in the previous section for U.S. data, these estimates are 
summarized in Table 3 with the same tests for directional asymmetry that were 
performed using national data (Table 2).  We find 37 states for which the sum of the 
coefficients on a positive price shock ( j ) is negative and statistically significant.  Not 
only are there 12 states for which  j  is statistically no different from zero, but for two 
states—North Dakota and Wyoming—it is positive and statistically significant.  On the 
other hand, there is near unanimity in the lack of statistical significance for  j .  The 
exceptions are Delaware and Wyoming, which have opposite signs on  j .  Finally, as 
shown in the final column of Table 3, directional symmetry cannot be rejected for 30 
states.  Thus, the blanket observation that oil-price shocks have asymmetric effects on 
economic activity appears to be false at this level of disaggregation. 
 To get an idea of the geographic distribution of the magnitudes of the effects of 
oil-price shocks, we map the estimates for the positive-shock coefficients (Figure 4).  For 
the most part, the nonconforming states—for which the sums of these coefficients are 
positive or not statistically significant—are energy states as determined by the relative 
12 
 
Table 3. The Spatial/Directional Asymmetry 
of Oil-Price Shocks, 1973:4-2008:4 
H0: 
     
0 i  
 
   
0 i   ii  
 
 i   
     F(.)   i  
    F(.) 
 
    F(.) 
 
AK 0.038 1.58 
 
0.039 1.53 
 
0.00 
 AL -0.030 7.52 * 0.010 0.74 
 
5.10* 
AR -0.046 13.98 * 0.008 0.34 
 
7.22 * 
AZ -0.053 15.45 * 0.013 0.84 
 
9.10 * 
CA -0.030 11.12 * 0.002 0.04 
 
4.92 * 
CO -0.010 0.89 
 
0.003 0.05 
 
0.57 
 CT -0.028 8.24 * 0.002 0.03 
 
3.44† 
DC -0.017 1.44 
 
-0.006 0.15 
 
0.24 
 DE -0.051 10.60 * -0.037 5.68 * 0.34
 FL -0.026 7.65 * -0.003 0.09 
 
2.35
 GA -0.053 18.77 * 0.003 0.07 
 
8.46* 
HI -0.013 1.15 
 
-0.014 1.10 
 
0.00 
 IA -0.018 3.09 † -0.014 1.69 
 
0.05
 ID -0.045 8.61 * -0.004 0.06 
 
2.53
 IL -0.022 6.23 * -0.006 0.40 
 
1.25
 IN -0.058 17.67 * -0.001 0.01 
 
7.22* 
KS -0.005 0.16 
 
0.012 0.96 
 
0.80 
 KY -0.034 6.14 * -0.010 0.49 
 
1.24
 LA 0.006 0.16 
 
0.025 2.14 
 
0.69
 MA -0.022 5.24 * 0.000 0.00 
 
1.97
 MD -0.039 12.70 * -0.006 0.28 
 
3.48† 
ME -0.029 5.36 * -0.020 2.11 
 
0.22 
 MI -0.072 19.90 * 0.003 0.04 
 
9.49* 
MN -0.021 5.07 * -0.010 0.93 
 
0.54 
 MO -0.042 13.43 * -0.003 0.08 
 
5.12* 
MS -0.047 14.81 * 0.012 0.90 
 
9.02 * 
MT -0.013 0.84 
 
0.010 0.41 
 
0.97 
 NC -0.048 16.66 * -0.010 0.64 
 
4.19* 
ND 0.023 3.81 † 0.004 0.11 
 
1.05 
 NE -0.025 5.07 * 0.016 1.84 
 
5.21* 
NH -0.023 2.76 † -0.001 0.01 
 
0.96 
 NJ -0.024 5.76 * -0.012 1.18 
 
0.59
 NM -0.013 1.71 
 
0.018 2.57 
 
3.51† 
NV -0.043 8.09 * -0.010 0.40 
 
1.83 
 NY -0.020 6.93 * -0.007 0.67 
 
1.09
 OH -0.042 14.67 * -0.008 0.54 
 
3.87† 
OK 0.018 1.48 
 
0.022 2.27 
 
0.05 
 OR -0.061 24.35 * 0.006 0.22 
 
11.28* 
PA -0.020 6.30 * -0.013 2.25 
 
0.32 
 RI -0.051 10.41 * -0.001 0.00 
 
4.06* 
SC -0.057 16.63 * -0.007 0.20 
 
4.77 * 
SD -0.010 0.78 
 
-0.004 0.08 
 
0.13 
 TN -0.054 21.12 * -0.005 0.19 
 
7.04* 
TX 0.004 0.16 
 
0.014 1.95 
 
0.60 
 UT -0.009 0.93 
 
0.015 2.17 
 
2.46
 VA -0.038 15.99 * -0.008 0.66 
 
3.72† 
VT -0.016 1.97 
 
-0.011 0.86 
 
0.08 
 WA -0.034 8.06 * 0.006 0.26 
 
4.50* 
WI -0.031 10.97 * -0.008 0.69 
 
2.29 
 WV -0.006 0.03 
 
0.018 0.26 
 
0.20
 WY 0.037 3.26 † 0.056 5.54 * 0.33
 Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and  ‗†‘,  respectively. 
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importance of energy production in their economies (Snead, 2009).
5
  Most of these states 
lie in the vast swath running from the western Gulf coast through Montana.  The 
exceptions are the non-energy states of Hawaii and Vermont. 
 
  
3.2. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry II: Impulse Responses 
 The preceding subsection looked at spatial asymmetries in oil-price shocks from 
the perspective of the shocks‘ estimated coefficients.  A different perspective can be 
gained from the state-level impulse responses to the shocks, which are generated via the 
estimated coefficients.  Figure 5 provides the post-break responses to positive and 
negative oil-price shocks for five representative states: three with variants of the typical 
directional asymmetry—California, Kansas, and Michigan—and two with atypical 
responses—New Mexico and Wyoming.   
                                                 
5
 As determined by Snead (2009), the 13 energy producing states are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
Figure 4. Positive Oil-Price Shock 
Sum of State γijs 
Post-Break, 1973:4 - 2008:4
US = -0.025
-0.072 to -0.032
-0.032 to -0.018
Not Significant
0.023 to 0.037
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Figure 5. Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break, Selected States 
Positive Price Shock Negative Price Shock 
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 Unsurprisingly, given its size and diversity, the response for California is 
asymmetric and looks much like that for the United States as a whole (recall Figure 3):  A 
positive oil-price shock leads to reduced employment growth for several quarters before 
returning to normal, but a negative oil-price shock has no effect on employment growth.  
Kansas has a negative but bouncy response to a positive oil-price shock, and its response 
to a negative oil-price shock is statistically insignificant.  Manufacturing-heavy states, 
such as Michigan, see a much deeper response to a positive oil-price shocks than does the 
country as a whole.  On the other hand, because Michigan‘s auto sector likely benefits 
from negative oil-price shocks, it has quarters for which the point estimates of its 
responses are positive, although not significantly so. 
 New Mexico is an example of a state with symmetric oil-price responses.  As an 
energy state, its response to a positive oil-price shock is much like that of Kansas: 
negative but bouncy.  But, because it is more energy intensive than Kansas, it experiences 
a positive and statistically significant response to negative oil-price shocks.  This result is 
consistent with Figure 2, which showed how New Mexico entered recessions after both 
types of oil-price shocks.  Our final example is Wyoming, the most energy-intensive state 
in the country, which experiences asymmetric responses to oil-price shocks, but not the 
typical kind.  It sees a statistically significant and huge positive response to negative oil-
price shocks only, but no statistically significant response to a positive oil-price shock. 
 The states are categorized in Table 4 according to their combination of responses 
to oil-price shocks.  A state is said to be responsive to a shock if it sees at least one 
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quarter when its response is statistically different from zero.  On this basis, 35 states see 
the typical directional asymmetry of responding only to positive oil-price shocks, 
whereas five energy-intensive states see the reverse directional asymmetry of responding 
only to negative oil-price shocks.  Finally, 10 states experience symmetric responses: five 
respond to both shocks and five respond to neither shock.  
 
Table 4. Spatial/Directional Asymmetry II, Impulse Responses 
Positive Shocks Only (36) 
Negative Shocks 
Only (5) 
Both  
Shocks (5) 
Neither Shock (5) 
AL IL MO PA LA DE AK 
AR IN MS RI ND ID CO 
AZ KS NE SC OK NC DC 
CA KY NH TN TX NM MT 
CT MA NJ UT WY VA SD 
FL MD NV VT 
  
  
GA ME NY WA 
  
  
HI MI OH WI 
  
  
IA MN OR WV 
  
  
A state experiences a shock if its response is statistically significant for at least one quarter. 
 
 Figure 6 illustrates the spatial distribution of responses to oil-price shocks, 
summarizing the responses according to their number of statistically significant quarters 
and the sums of the responses across those quarters.  The states that were least responsive 
to positive oil-price shocks tended to be energy states and their neighbors, and the size of 
their responses were related to their energy-intensity.  Even so, several northeastern states 
were also among the groups with the smallest responses.  The states most affected by 
positive oil-price shocks included much of the Far West and the two most manufacturing-
intensive states, Indiana and Michigan.  Being an energy state was also associated with 
having a large positive response to a negative-oil-price shock: The six most energy-
17 
 
intensive states were so affected.  On the other hand, there are five non-energy states with 
positive responses to negative oil-price shocks, although it was for one quarter only in 
each case.  
 
Figure 6. Summary of State Responses to Oil-Price Shocks, Post-Break 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 Nearly all of the literature examining the effects of oil shocks has concluded that 
oil-price increases are directionally asymmetric in their effects on the U.S. economy.  
Positive Price Shock Negative Price Shock 
Number of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 6
0 
1 or 2
3 or 4
5 or 6
7 
Number of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 0
0
1
2
3
Sum of Significant Quarters
U.S. = -0.56
-1.20 to -0.90
-0.90 to -0.70
-0.70 to -0.42
-0.42 to -0.05
0
Sum of Significant Quarters
U.S. = 0
0
0.07 to 0.17
0.19 to 0.39
0.90
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That is, sharp increases in oil prices affect economic activity adversely, but sharp 
decreases in oil prices have no effect.  We consider several variations on the notion of 
price-shock symmetry, all of which indicate that the usual asymmetry assumption is far 
from the rule across states.  For example, only 21 states pass a standard test for 
directional asymmetry, which is that the sums of the coefficients on positive and negative 
shocks are not statistically the same.  A similar picture emerges from an analysis of state-
level impulse responses to oil-price shocks.  Although most states have typical responses 
to oil-price shocks—they experience positive shocks only—the rest experience either 
negative shocks only (5 states), both positive and negative shocks (5 states), or neither 
shock (5).  The magnitudes of the effects shocks also differ a great deal across states.  
The most energy-intensive states respond only to negative oil-price shocks and the states 
that respond to both shocks are is a mixed bag, including several non-energy states.  
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Appendix. Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
AK 0.365 * 0.114  0.441 * -0.252 * -0.254  0.528  -0.859 † 0.687 † 0.023  0.003  0.012  0.001  0.036 * 0.001  0.003  -0.002  0.149  
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.083
) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.368) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.359) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.213) 
 
                  AL 0.045  0.119  0.157  0.198 † 1.270 * -1.112 * 0.126  -0.212  0.004  -0.008  -0.008  -0.018 * 0.004  0.005  0.003  -0.002  0.246 * 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.122
) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.070) 
 
                  AR 0.557 * -0.106  -0.002  0.069  0.466 † -0.565 † 0.158  -0.065  -0.011  -0.002  -0.007  -0.026 * 0.006  -0.004  0.007  -0.001  0.359 * 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.152
) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.301) 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.080) 
 
                  AZ 0.324 * 0.372 * 0.129  0.026  0.891 * -1.348 * 0.463 † -0.222  0.011  -0.018 * -0.033 * -0.014  0.004  -0.001  0.011  -0.001  0.353 * 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.107
) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.250) 
 
(0.274) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.094) 
 
                  CA 0.556 * 0.123  0.049  0.137  0.365 * -0.363 * -0.007  -0.044  0.005  -0.013 * -0.009  -0.012 * 0.004  -0.007  0.002  0.003  0.149 * 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.123
) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.056) 
 
                  CO 0.517 * 0.163  0.142  -0.062  0.456 * -0.443 * 0.168  -0.190  0.006  -0.007  -0.004  -0.004  0.006  0.005  0.002  -0.009  0.183 * 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.118
) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.072) 
 
                  CT 0.086  0.413 * 0.212 * 0.040  0.758 * -0.572 * -0.002  -0.154  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.022 * -0.004  -0.002  0.001  0.007  0.108  
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.105
) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.202) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.068) 
 
                  DC 0.072  0.184 * 0.153  0.184 † 0.233  -0.159  -0.029  0.068  0.001  -0.005  -0.003  -0.009  0.010  -0.004  0.001  -0.013  0.053  
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091
) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.089) 
 
                  DE -0.139  0.280 * 0.122  -0.109  0.786 * -0.579 * 0.320  -0.259  -0.014  0.004  -0.017 † -0.024 * 0.000  -0.014  -0.007  -0.016 * 0.341 * 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.097
) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.279) 
 
(0.277) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.098) 
 
                  FL 0.735 * -0.045  0.443 * -0.282 * 0.233  -0.126  -0.371 * 0.097  0.003  -0.010 † -0.010  -0.009  0.006  -0.009  0.005  -0.005  0.233 * 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.116
) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.064) 
 
                  GA 0.444 * 0.141  0.068  -0.091  0.476 * -0.533 † 0.019  0.111  -0.008  -0.013 † -0.010  -0.021 * 0.005  -0.005  0.002  0.001  0.367 * 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.138
) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.205) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.080) 
 
                  HI 0.182 † 0.286 * 0.360 * -0.138  0.506 * -0.538 * 0.238  -0.059  0.005  -0.001  -0.014 † -0.003  0.006  -0.018 * 0.002  -0.004  0.082  
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.086
) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.083) 
 
                  IA 0.123  0.169  0.534 * -0.052  0.980 * -0.642 * -0.583 * 0.135  0.005  0.003  -0.011 † -0.014 * 0.002  -0.006  -0.002  -0.009  0.144 * 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.118
) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.063) 
 
                  ID 0.437 * 0.055  0.436 * -0.168  0.469 † -0.835 * 0.058  0.106  0.009  -0.014  -0.023 * -0.017 † 0.000  -0.002  -0.006  0.004  0.341 * 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.127
) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.346) 
 
(0.336) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.106) 
 
                  IL 0.047  0.167  0.202 * -0.259 * 0.926 * -0.096  -0.426 * 0.217  -0.006  0.001  0.003  -0.020 * 0.001  -0.008  -0.004  0.005  -0.038  
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.101
) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.061) 
 
                  IN 0.055  0.164  0.121  0.002  1.231 * -0.845 * -0.033  -0.178  -0.010  -0.020 * -0.009  -0.019 * 0.004  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  0.273 * 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.140
) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.320) 
 
(0.325) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.084) 
 
                  KS 0.102  0.209 † 0.204 † -0.073  0.809 * -0.409 † -0.304  0.179  0.008  -0.011  0.002  -0.003  0.002  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.148 † 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.112
) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.230) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.075) 
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Appendix (continued). Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
KY -0.136  0.286 * 0.004  0.159  1.394 * -1.002 * 0.259  -0.261  -0.007  -0.018 * 0.007  -0.015 † 0.006  -0.011  0.005  -0.011  0.207 * 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.297) 
 
(0.305) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.086) 
 
                  LA 0.284 * 0.108  0.247 * -0.018  0.609 * -0.320  -0.126  -0.010  0.007  0.000  0.009  -0.009  0.022 * 0.009  -0.002  -0.004  0.077  
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.093) 
 
                  MA 0.304 * 0.362 * 0.423 * -0.256 * 0.933 * -1.047 * -0.115  0.093  0.006  -0.010 † -0.005  -0.013 * 0.005  -0.002  0.002  -0.005  0.150 * 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.065) 
 
                  MD 0.007  0.259 * 0.197 † 0.083  0.611 * -0.202  -0.392 † 0.163  -0.007  -0.014 * -0.010  -0.007  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.204 * 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.069) 
 
                  ME 0.264 * 0.065  0.101  0.126  0.914 * -0.964 * 0.306  -0.216  0.000  -0.003  -0.018 * -0.008  -0.007  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006  0.203 * 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  MI 0.236 † 0.030  0.411 * -0.207  0.939 * -0.818 * -0.309  0.289  -0.008  -0.023 * -0.017 † -0.023 * 0.006  0.001  -0.005  0.002  0.251 * 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.275) 
 
(0.331) 
 
(0.314) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.107) 
 
                  MN 0.110  0.277 * 0.178  0.038  0.846 * -0.551 * 0.041  -0.162  -0.004  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005  -0.003  -0.004  0.003  -0.006  0.154 * 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.059) 
 
                  MO 0.017  0.038  0.074  -0.191  0.969 * -0.411 † -0.065  0.230  -0.007  -0.025 * 0.000  -0.010  0.000  -0.009  0.005  0.000  0.159 * 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.067) 
 
                  MS 0.517 * 0.133  0.022  -0.070  0.515 * -0.759 * -0.004  0.255  0.004  -0.012  -0.026 * -0.014  0.013 † -0.008  0.001  0.006  0.265 * 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  MT 0.155 † 0.097  0.184 † 0.142  0.885 * -0.647 * -0.342  0.101  0.004  -0.009  -0.012  0.004  0.014  -0.008  -0.001  0.006  0.247 * 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.102) 
 
                  NC 0.432 * 0.151  -0.328 * -0.054  0.574 * -0.668 * 0.657 * -0.116  -0.002  -0.012 † -0.024 * -0.011  -0.001  -0.004  0.001  -0.006  0.335 * 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.234) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.077) 
 
                  ND 0.236 * 0.220 * 0.079  0.051  0.946 * -1.007 * 0.268  -0.016  0.011  0.003  0.000  0.009  0.015 * -0.009  -0.001  -0.001  0.070  
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.208) 
 
(0.231) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  NE 0.119  -0.055  0.138  -0.259 * 0.595 * -0.271  0.012  0.370 * 0.001  -0.005  -0.017 * -0.004  0.008  0.003  0.000  0.005  0.233 * 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.211) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.075) 
 
                  NH 0.329 * 0.358 * 0.246 * -0.011  0.571 * -0.844 * -0.039  -0.192  -0.003  -0.008  -0.008  -0.004  0.002  -0.002  0.003  -0.004  0.308 * 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.286) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.090) 
 
                  NJ 0.163  0.374 * 0.054  0.050  0.612 * -0.548 * -0.021  -0.035  -0.001  -0.005  -0.003  -0.014 * -0.002  -0.006  -0.007  0.004  0.142 * 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.166) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.065) 
 
                  NM 0.282 * 0.095  0.227 * 0.060  0.611 * -0.596 * 0.011  0.023  0.008  -0.019 * -0.005  0.004  0.009  0.003  0.000  0.006  0.242 * 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.080) 
 
                  NV 0.444 * 0.256 * 0.132  -0.074  0.522 * -0.660 * 0.290  -0.100  -0.001  -0.023 * -0.010  -0.009  -0.011  0.000  0.002  -0.002  0.348 * 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.227) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.279) 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.116) 
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Appendix (continued). Regression Results, Dependent Variable = Quarterly State Employment Growth 
Variable 
jtiy  ,  jtiY  ,  

 jtx  

 jtx     αi  
Lag j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4  j = 1  j = 2  j = 3  j = 4        
NY 0.210 † 0.389 * 0.027  0.089  0.512 * -0.428 * 0.110  -0.176  0.004  -0.013 * -0.003  -0.008  -0.003  -0.003  0.004  -0.005  0.082  
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.051) 
 
                  OH -0.115  -0.074  0.370 * 0.044  1.243 * -0.207  -0.376  -0.146  -0.004  -0.013 * -0.009  -0.015 * -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  0.039  
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.262) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.084) 
 
                  OK 0.258 * 0.307 * 0.024  0.011  0.427 * -0.035  -0.094  0.017  0.002  0.010  0.007  -0.001  0.020 * 0.019 * -0.019 * 0.002  0.020  
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.086) 
 
                  OR 0.576 * 0.010  0.128  0.075  0.223  -0.393  0.051  -0.041  -0.004  -0.013 † -0.025 * -0.019 * 0.000  0.011  -0.004  0.000  0.337 * 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.265) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.079) 
 
                  PA -0.167  0.271 * -0.012  0.099  0.975 * -0.546 * 0.128  -0.147  0.000  -0.005  -0.006  -0.010 † 0.002  -0.005  0.000  -0.009 † 0.014  
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.059) 
 
                  RI 0.140  0.029  0.178  -0.103  1.126 * -0.849 * 0.075  -0.101  0.011  -0.020 * -0.012  -0.030 * 0.002  -0.004  0.003  -0.001  0.190 † 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.328) 
 
(0.331) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.103) 
 
                  SC -0.025  0.032  -0.079  -0.006  1.354 * -0.735 * 0.151  -0.072  0.005  -0.017 * -0.012  -0.033 * -0.001  -0.007  0.006  -0.005  0.373 * 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.290) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.090) 
 
                  SD 0.121  0.114  0.213 * 0.146  0.945 * -0.549 * -0.185  -0.211  -0.006  0.000  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.009  0.003  0.003  0.238 * 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.084) 
 
                  TN 0.227  0.247 † -0.105  -0.016  0.923 * -0.845 * 0.108  0.008  -0.009  -0.009  -0.011  -0.024 * 0.003  -0.009  0.000  0.001  0.329 * 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.277) 
 
(0.281) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.072) 
 
                  TX 0.803 * 0.087  -0.279 * 0.099  0.151  -0.185  0.344 * -0.196 † 0.007  -0.001  -0.006  0.004  0.022 * -0.007  -0.001  0.000  0.150 * 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.128) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.058) 
 
                  UT 0.252 * 0.429 * 0.057  -0.057  0.849 * -0.817 * 0.337 † -0.232  0.005  -0.003  -0.007  -0.004  0.009  -0.005  0.008  0.004  0.230 * 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.076) 
 
                  VA 0.119  0.482 * 0.190  -0.223 † 0.623 * -0.683 * 0.052  0.131  -0.005  -0.013 * -0.006  -0.014 * 0.001  -0.006  -0.006  0.002  0.271 * 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.122) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.063) 
 
                  VT 0.351 * 0.026  0.273 * 0.129  0.562 * -0.352 † -0.209  -0.071  -0.006  -0.009  -0.003  0.002  -0.002  -0.004  0.004  -0.009  0.149 * 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.073) 
 
                  WA 0.333 * 0.235 * 0.219 † -0.052  0.291  -0.060  -0.232  0.083  -0.004  -0.009  -0.013 † -0.008  0.005  0.004  -0.001  -0.002  0.233 * 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.078) 
 
                  WI 0.037  0.172  0.287 * -0.027  0.904 * -0.470 * -0.181  -0.017  0.000  -0.014 * -0.009  -0.008  0.001  -0.003  -0.006  -0.001  0.186 * 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.059) 
 
                  WV -0.395 * -0.072  -0.180 † -0.060  1.740 * -1.184 † 0.799  0.114  -0.034 † 0.012  0.024  -0.008  0.002  0.002  0.010  0.005  -0.201  
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.466) 
 
(0.678) 
 
(0.672) 
 
(0.470) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.218) 
 
                  WY 0.432 * 0.033  0.275 * -0.123  0.668 * -0.003  -0.227  0.001  0.011  0.000  0.031 * -0.005  0.040 * 0.014  0.015  -0.014  0.015  
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.341) 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.124) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels are indicated by ‗*‘ and ‗†‘, respectively. 
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